By Robert Jervis, Jack Snyder
Fearing the lack of Korea and Vietnam could spark off a series response of different international locations turning communist, the USA fought significant wars within the hinterlands of Asia. What bills for such exaggerated alarm, and what have been its outcomes? Is an apprehension of the domino impression completely rooted within the American strategic psyche, or has the USA now followed a much less alarmist method? The essays during this publication tackle those questions by means of analyzing domino pondering in usa and Soviet chilly battle technique, and in previous ancient settings. Combining idea and heritage in studying matters appropriate to present public coverage, Dominoes and Bandwagons examines the level to which domino fears have been a rational reaction, a mental response, or a tactic in family politics.
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Additional resources for Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland
Secretary of State George Schultz, in Department of State Bulletin, vol. ) We begin to see light. Germany is playing for the highest stakes. If her demands are acceded to either on the Congo or in Morocco, ... it will mean definitely the subjection of France. The conditions demanded are not such as a country having an independent foreign policy can possibly accept. The details of the terms are not so very important now. This is a trial of strength, if anything. Concession means not loss of interests or loss of prestige.
Object . . was not to rectify a local situation but to test the general American will to resist. . " Those who disagreed did so because they did not see the issue in such general terms. "Some who knew the Soviet Union best, like Ambassadors Thompson and Harriman, believed that, on the contrary, Khrushchev's objectives might well be limited. Thompson argued . . "10 Khrushchev himself described the issue in terms that mirrored Acheson's: The question of access to West Berlin and the whole question of the peace treaty is for [the Western Powers] only a pretext.
Everyone knows that is the case. 66 This reasoning can be carried a step further. There is no reason why only international actions should be used to infer the character of the state and its leaders. That is, if observers are interested in the state's—and the decision maker's67—willingness to pay a significant price to reach valued objectives, then domestic behavior can also be highly diagnostic. 69 Effect or effort? The reasoning processes described in the previous section help explain the puzzling fact that statesmen often argue that the damage to their state's reputation comes, not from being unable to prevent a local defeat, but from refusing to make a major effort to do so.
Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland by Robert Jervis, Jack Snyder